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Abstract China’s industrialisation transformed global mar-
kets for mineral commodities. As growth in China slows and
becomes less material intensive, the question arises whether
countries of South and Southeast Asia can take up the baton
fromChina and give a further boost to global mineral demand.
The economic prospects of South and Southeast Asia are un-
doubtedly promising, helped by growing populations and a
fast-expanding middle class. However, the model of growth
being embraced by these countries is different from that of
China and likely to be less material intensive. Also, many of
them are economically coming off a very low base. With
respect to the supply of minerals to the region, the impact of
India’s growth on global mineral markets will be limited by
the fact that many of India’s mineral needs can be met from
domestic sources. In Southeast Asia, some of the mineral re-
quirements will be met from domestic resources while some
of its requirements for finished metals will likely continue to
be met from China which is a heavy investor in the region and
which has massive surplus metallurgical capacity.
Keywords South andSoutheastAsia .China . India .Mineral
demand, mining, one belt one road
Introduction
Asia has reshaped the global demand for minerals over the
past 20 years and is set to play a big part in shaping it over the
next 20. International forecasting agencies suggest that eco-
nomic growth and growth per head of population will be faster
in Asia than in any other region. The population across South
and Southeast Asia is also projected to grow strongly, while
the middle classes of Asia should more than double over the
period, contributing significant spending power. So under-
standing what is happening here is of crucial importance to
the global mining industry.
What is next after China?
Up until now, the narrative of Asia’s mineral demand growth
has been wholly dominated by China. Driven by rapid
industrialisation and urbanisation, China’s demand for min-
erals soared, helping to trigger the largest commodity price
boom of recent times. In the mid-1990s, China accounted
for some 10–15% of global mineral demand. Twenty years
later, it accounted for 50%, a position of dominance un-
matched since the US domination of global mineral markets
in the years immediately following World War II.
Given this degree of dominance, what happens in China
clearly remains extraordinarily important to the performance
of metal and mineral markets. However, since 2010, China’s
economic growth rate has been slowing and government pol-
icies have been increasingly focused on trying to promote
growth in domestic consumption and in services, which are,
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by their nature, less material intensive than exports and invest-
ment, the drivers of China’s earlier growth. This is potentially
a problem for suppliers of mineral raw materials.
Alongside closely monitoring China’s economy, industry
observers have begun to ask the question, what happens next?
As demand from China slows, who will pick up the baton and
drive things forward? Which countries should we be looking
at if we are seeking to forecast future demand for minerals? In
short, who, or where, is the next China?
India is the country most frequently mentioned in this con-
text. It has a population very similar in size to China but an
income per head (in PPP terms) almost 60% lower—US$6616
vs US$15,399 in 2016 (IMF 2017)—so it has a lot of head-
room for growth. The other countries of the India sub-conti-
nent, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, represent a further
377 million people (Table 1). Also of growing interest eco-
nomically are the countries of Southeast Asia, specifically the
ten member countries of Asean (the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations). Although the Asean countries are highly var-
ied in terms of their income per head—ranging from rich
Singapore to the very much poorer Cambodia—collectively
they constitute another 638 million persons. In total, therefore,
in South and Southeast Asia, one is looking at a region with a
population of over 2.3 billion, almost a billion more than the
population of China.
From the perspective of economic performance, as impor-
tant as the size of a population is the composition of that
population. One aspect of this is the population’s age structure
and the proportion of the population available to the labour
force. Through much of South and Southeast Asia, and in
contrast to China, populations are young and the proportion
of the population accounted for by working-age people is
rising. More than half of Asean’s population is under the age
of 30 (Asean Secretariat 2017). This is a hugely positive indi-
cator for future economic growth.
Another aspect is the growth in the proportion of the pop-
ulation deemed middle class. The definition of what consti-
tutes middle class varies, but generally it covers those having a
daily income in the range US$10–US$100 a day (Yueh 2016).
It is typically the case that as incomes rise above a certain
point then consumers are relieved of having to devote their
entire income to buying essentials with the result that a dis-
proportionate amount of any income above this level is spent
on consumer durables. Historically, this has proven highly
supportive of mineral demand.
The last point, and it is an important one, is that a number of
countries in South and Southeast Asia have in recent years
elected, or else acquired by other means, business-friendly
governments which have set themselves the objective of using
their competitive labour forces as a platform for boosting the
living standards of their peoples through the encouragement
of enterprise and the flow of inward investment. The econom-
ic potential of this region and the possibilities offered by re-
gional integration to boost this potential still further currently
constitutes the most compelling growth story in the world.
The remainder of this article takes a closer look at the
economies of South and Southeast Asia and what their future
growth might imply for mineral commodity markets.
India’s growth prospects
For much of the last 20 years, growth in the Indian economy
has lagged behind that of China. However, this is changing.
Since 2015, GDP growth in India has begun to push ahead of
that in China and projections by international agencies such as
the IMF show the gap between growth rates in the two coun-
tries widening (in India’s favour) in coming years (Fig. 1).
The reasons behind this are several fold. A key driver of
GDP growth is population, and India’s population growth is
significantly outstripping China’s. India’s population is cur-
rently growing at 1.3% a year against China’s 0.4%.
According to the UN Population Division, India’s population
will overtake China’s in 2022 (UN 2017). Even more impor-
tantly from an economic perspective, the same data source
shows the proportion of India’s population of working age
rising until the 2030s while China’s, largely because of its
one child policy, started to decline in 2015.
A second factor is simply that India is coming off a much
lower base than China. One of the key factors driving growth
Table 1 South and Souteast Asia population and income per head in
2016
Population million GDP/head US$
Indian sub-continent
Bangladesh 161.5 3891
India 1309.3 6616
Pakistan 193.6 5106
Sri Lanka 21.3 12,262
1685.7
Asean
Brunei 0.4 76,884
Cambodia 15.8 3737
Indonesia 258.7 11,720
Laos 7.2 5710
Malaysia 31.7 27,267
Myanmar 523 5832
Philippines 104.2 7728
Singapore 5.6 87,855
Thailand 69.0 16,888
Vietnam 92.6 6429
637.5
Source: IMF,WEO, April 17. GDP is based on purchasing power parities
(PPPs)
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in emerging economies is their capacity to rapidly increase
productivity by importing technologies and work practices
from elsewhere, in other words, to exploit the opportunities
of economic catch-up. As the gap with technologies and work
practices employed elsewhere diminishes, and as local wage
costs rise, so rapid productivity growth becomes harder to
sustain. China is facing this reality now. India has a long
way to go before this becomes a problem.
The other factor, already alluded to above, is the prospec-
tive growth in the middle class. Growth in India’s income per
head in coming years is expected to dramatically expand its
middle class, and, with it, the country’s demand for improved
residential properties and consumer durables. This is not just
significant at a national level, it has global significance too.
Research by The Brookings Institution indicates that between
2015 and 2030, the global middle class will grow from 3
million to 5.4 million. Much the biggest contributor to this
growth will be Asia with an increase of 2.1 million. Within
that Asian number, the biggest increase will come from India.
By 2030, India will have a middle class similar in size numer-
ically to that in China. In terms of consumer spending power
(PPP based), it is estimated that India’s middle classes will
account for 17% of the global total, and will be second only
to China, at 22% (Kharas 2017).
On the face of it, this suggests a very positive outlook for
mineral demand in India. But India is not China. And com-
parisons between the two countries are not straightforward.
Comparisons with China
The difference between China’s and India’s use of minerals is
far greater than can be accounted for by the relative sizes of
their GDP. While India’s GDP is currently 40% that of China,
its use of minerals is only 5–10% that of China’s, at least for
industrial metals (Fig. 2). Gold is a bit different as discussed
below.
The simple fact is that China’s recent growth has been
unusually material intensive, and that, by comparison with
most other countries, India included, it uses far more mineral
raw materials per unit of economic growth. Figure 3 shows
how much more metal China uses in generating a million
dollars of GDP than India. For example, China uses eight
times as much aluminium to generate a million dollars of
GDP than does India.
It has long been understood that the stage of a country’s
development has important implications for its use of mineral
raw materials (Malenbaum 1978). As an economy moves from
an agricultural to an industrial basis, its use of materials accel-
erates rapidly, with rates of materials’ use typically
outstripping—sometimes substantially—the rate of growth in
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the economy as a whole. As an economy matures, and devel-
opment becomes more focused on service sector activities, so
the material intensity of economic growth diminishes. The
stylised version of this process shows mineral raw material
use of a country progressing in an elongated S-shaped fashion.
In practice, there is significant variation between countries
in how this model applies (Crowson 2017). Small
industrialised export-oriented countries like South Korea and
Taiwan show unusually high levels of material use, while
countries whose competitive advantages lie in producing
raw materials rather than manufacturing, like Australia and
Canada, follow a flatter path. Although a continental-scale
economy, China’s use of mineral raw materials has, up to
now, followed a path surprisingly close to that of its smaller
Asian neighbours.
Part of the explanation for this is structural. China’s growth
has over the past 20 years given emphasis to exports of
manufactured goods and to the infrastructure and plant neces-
sary to support the growth of these exports. It has thus had to
build not just the factories to make manufactured goods and to
supply themwith rawmaterials, but has had to build the roads,
railways, ports, airports, power stations and power networks
to supply those factories and carry their goods away, as well as
building accommodation and services for the many millions
of people flowing from the countryside to the cities to work in
the factories.
The effects of this can be seen in the composition of
China’s economy. Although the service sector in China has
latterly been growing fast, 40% of its GDP is still accounted
for by industry. In India, the share is just under 30%. India’s
agricultural and service sectors are commensurately larger (at
17 and 54% of GDP respectively). While in China exports are
equivalent to 19% of GDP, in India the proportion is only
12%. India’s economy is thus more domestically driven
(World Bank 2017).
Levels of investment are another point of difference be-
tween the two countries. Looking at GDP from the perspective
of expenditure, it is clear that investment in China’s economy
represents a much higher proportion of GDP than is the case in
India. Since 2003, China’s investment as a share of GDP has
averaged 44%, at the peak of the boom rising to 48%. In India,
investment as a proportion of GDP has averaged 35%, a figure
more in line with the average of other emerging economies in
Asia, but well below China (Fig. 4). In short, India has pur-
sued a rather different, and significantly less mineral intensive,
form of growth than China.
While it is likely that India’s economic growth will continue
to contribute to growth in future global mineral demand, the
chances of it following the pattern of mineral use in China are
slim. The focus of growth is likely to continue to be on the
domestic economy. Private consumption accounts for almost
60% of India’s GDP against less than 40% in China. As a
democracy, it is less practical for India to prioritise export
growth over domestic demand and then salt away the gains
from this in foreign exchange reserves under the control of
the state as occurred in China. Growth has to be more socially
inclusive. It is also likely that India will continue to give em-
phasis in its growth to agriculture and to service sector activity,
the former for political reasons, the latter because this is an area
where India has been highly successful in establishing global
competitive advantage, helped by the less burdensome regula-
tion of the service sector compared with manufacturing and by
the widespread use of the English language in the country.
India, in short, is unlikely to follow the same pattern of
industrialisation as China (Nageswaran and Natarajan 2016).
Another point of difference is that India does not have
China’s capacity for top-down, central economic direction.
Availability of financial resources along with the need to
maintain a fragile political consensus restricts the ability of
the government in India to promote centrally directed
investment-led growth. Its economically more liberal model
requires a more demand-led approach, one that gives primary
emphasis to encouraging the bottom-up growth of private,
often family, businesses, and domestic consumer demand.
The ability of the government to direct the economy centrally
is also restricted by the fact that states in India have very
significant economic discretion (Anand 2013). Thus, while it
may be true that India desperately needs massive investment
in infrastructure—and the government has many initiatives to
promote such investment, including a US$60 billion commit-
ment to infrastructure in the February 2017 budget—the com-
plexities of government in India and the reality that such in-
frastructure building tends to come in response to demonstrat-
ed economic need rather than anticipated future requirements
(as is often the case in China) makes it unlikely that India will
emulate China’s sky-high levels of investment.
A particular area of promise for mineral demand in India
follows directly from the rapid growth in its middle class.
Given its different social-economic structure, Indian citizens
are likely to be able to retain a higher proportion of national
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income for personal expenditure than has typically been the
case in China. And, as noted above, as incomes rise, so dis-
cretionary spending on consumer and luxury goods increases
at a proportionately faster rate.
One commodity where India is already a major global con-
sumer is gold. Although it varies year to year which country is
the largest consumer of gold, between them India and China
account for around half the world’s demand for gold for fab-
rication. For cultural and economic reasons, India has long
been one of the world’s biggest buyers of gold. Indians like
gold as a store of value but also for gift-giving and as an
adornment. As India’s middle class grows and disposable in-
comes rise, so there is potential for this market to grow signif-
icantly further—or so theWorld Gold Council believes at least
(WGC 2017).
Sourcing India’s mineral raw materials
To assess the likely impact of India’s economic growth on
global mineral markets, it is necessary to consider India’s re-
source endowment and how much of its growing demand for
minerals it is likely to be able to supply from domestic sources.
Part of China’s impact on global mineral markets arose from
the fact that for certain key minerals necessary for its
industrialisation, China’s domestic mineral resources are some-
what limited, requiring it to turn to international markets for
supplies. Thus, for commodities such as iron ore, bauxite, copper
and nickel, China’s demand has had a dramatic effect on global
markets and on mine producers in other parts of the world.
India can generally be considered a mineral-rich country,
although, as with China, it inevitably has some gaps in its
endowment. Given the relatively low levels of its mineral
use in the past, it has not on the whole needed to rely too
heavily on imported supplies (Table 2). It has also traditionally
been somewhat protectionist in its thinking, preferring self-
sufficiency where it could be achieved, and history offers sev-
eral instances where India has discouraged exports of minerals
for fear of running down its domestic resources and also of
encouraging the use of minerals which occur locally over
those which have to be imported.
India is reasonably well endowed with iron ore, having 6%
of the world’s iron ore reserves by iron content according to
the US Geological Survey (USGS 2017). For years, the gov-
ernment has restricted the export of India’s better-quality ores
(notably those from Bailadila) on the grounds that they are, or
will be, required for domestic steel production. In more recent
years, India’s exports of lower-quality iron ore rose rapidly—
from 31 million tonnes in 1999 to 101 million tonnes in 2008
(WSA 2016)—to meet China’s burgeoning demand for
imported ore before falling away sharply as the government
intervened to constrain these exports, this on the grounds that
a lot of the trade was being conducted by unregulated and
environmentally destructive operators.
India is significantly less well-endowed with copper re-
sources. Historically, this led the country to discourage the
use and import of the metal, and to encourage instead the
use of aluminium, where India was better endowed. With
copper such a critical metal in so many modern electrical
and electronic applications, this was clearly sub-optimal eco-
nomically and in recent years India has relaxed its attitude to
copper imports. India, like China, has become a major import-
er of copper concentrates for processing in its domestic
smelters and refineries. The Indian mining company,
Vedanta, has also sought to bolster the country’s access to
copper by investing in copper overseas, most notably in the
Konkola copper mining and smelting operations in Zambia.
Amongst other metallic minerals, India has substantial re-
sources of bauxite. Based on these, it has long had an alumin-
ium industry and the country is typically a net exporter of
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aluminium. A broadly similar situation exists for lead and zinc
where India is a world-class producer and where domestic
mine and metal production are usually (albeit not in 2016)
sufficient to meet domestic market requirements.
For other commodities, India is less well endowed. India is
not a major producer of nickel, and most of the nickel required
for its large stainless steel industry has to be imported in the
form of refined nickel or ferronickel. India is almost wholly
reliant on imports for its substantial requirement for gold and
platinum group metals, but it has a modest production of sil-
ver. For coal, the situation is a bit more complex. While India
has substantial domestic resources of thermal coal, some of
this coal is of poor quality and needs to be blended with
higher-quality coal from elsewhere, so the country is typically
a net importer. For coking coal, used in its steel industry, India
has limited local resources and is a significant importer.
The impact of India’s growing demand for mineral prod-
ucts on global mineral markets is thus likely to be mixed
amongst commodities, with the biggest impacts likely to be
felt in the markets for copper, nickel, precious metals and
coking coal.
Economic development in Southeast Asia
As a large and diverse region, Southeast Asia is rather harder to
generalise about than India with respect to its mineral require-
ments and mineral endowment. The region includes large
resource-rich countries like Indonesia and the Philippines,
resource-poor but otherwise rich city states like Singapore
and countries in the early stages of their economic development
like Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. There are also significant
differences in the politics of the countries, some being demo-
cratic, some avowedly communist and some authoritarian.
The economic outlook for the region is considered, howev-
er, to be prospectively very promising as noted earlier. Along
with India, the IMF sees the Asean 5 (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) as the fastest-growing
region in the world over the period to 2022. The other Asean
countries, those often referred to as the CLMV countries
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam), are, however, fore-
cast to grow even faster (Table 3) (Note that the tenth member
of Asean, Brunei, has been excluded from this analysis.). The
potential of the Asean region is considered massive.
CLMV countries have an aggregate population of 170 mil-
lion and, with wages significantly below those in China, have
begun to draw manufacturing industry away from the China
mainland. Moreover, whatever the ostensible differences in
their politics, most governments in the region are keen to
present themselves as business-friendly and supportive of in-
dustry and enterprise. Exports from the region are growing
strongly. According to the Asean Secretariat, total trade in
the region increased by US$700 billion between 2007 and
2015 with intra-Asean trade comprising the largest share of
total Asean trade (Asean Secretariat 2017). As these data im-
ply, this is also a story about regional economic integration.
While the USA has shown its disinterest in further deepen-
ing its trade relationships in the region with its withdrawal
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), this is likely simply
to create a bigger opportunity for other countries, including
China, to step up their role as trade leaders in the region. Quite
Table 2 Mineral balances for
India in 2016 Mine prod. Metal prod. Consumption Prod—cons
Aluminium 24.2 Mt bauxite 1909.1 kt 1377.6 kt + 531.5 kt
Copper 27.6 kt copper 768.2 kt 499.3 kt + 268.9 kt
Lead 138.9 kt lead 508.3 kt 566.8 kt − 58.5 kt
Nickel – 0.3 kt 57.4 kt − 57.1 kt
Zinc 649.0 kt zinc 611.8 kt 672.4 kt − 60.6 kt
Iron ore/steel 178.6 Mt iron ore 95.6 Mt 83.5 Mt + 12.1 Mt
Coal 288.5 oil equiv 411.9 oe − 123.4 oe
Gold – 16.3 m.oz fabr
Silver 14 million oz 163.4 m.oz fabr
Source: WBMS, WSA, BP, GFMS, Silver Institute
Table 3 Forecast GDP growth in India and in Asean
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
India 6.8 7.2 7.7 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.2
Indonesia 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5
Malaysia 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8
Philippines 6.8 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Singapore 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
Thailand 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0
Asean-5 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
Cambodia 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.3
Lao PDR 6.9 6.8 6.7 7.0 6.9 7.0 6.7
Myanmar 6.3 7.5 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
Vietnam 6.2 6.5 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
Source: IMF, WEO, April 2017
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separate from the TPP, there is currently an Asean-led discus-
sion on multilateral trade liberalisation, entitled Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), taking place
across the wider region. Unlike the TPP, this initiative includes
China. Asean has also been seeking to promote integration
within the Asean region through initiatives of the Asean
Economic Community (AEC). These include a package of
measure entitled AEC Blueprint 2025, adopted by the Asean
leaders at their summit in Kuala Lumpur in November 2015.
Investment is the key to sustaining the region’s growth out-
look. The Asian Development Bank says Southeast Asia needs
to spend US$210 billion a year to 2030 (5.7% of GDP) on
infrastructure (defined as transport, power, telecommunica-
tions, water supply and sanitation) if it is to maintain its growth,
tackle poverty and deal with the effects of climate change
(ADB 2017). Fortunately, levels of public debt across Asean
are low by international standards (the average across the re-
gion is 39% of GDP), leaving central and local government free
to borrow to invest in much-needed infrastructure without un-
duly squeezing out private investment. Some of the targets for
infrastructure building are ambitious. The Indonesian govern-
ment is committed to a large programme of infrastructure build-
ing, with plans over 3 years (starting 2016) to build 35,000MW
of electricity generating capacity, 2850 km of new roads and
3200 km of railways, together with new seaports and airports.
The Philippines in 2016 increased infrastructure spending to the
high level of 5% of GDP. In Thailand, it is claimed that some
US$51 billion of infrastructure projects will be underway be-
fore 2018. By 2020, Malaysia will have invested another
US$44 billion in upgrading transport links and in building
new roads and railways.
The situation with respect to foreign direct investment
(FDI) is equally positive. North Asia, which is to say, China,
Japan and South Korea, enjoys a surfeit of capital, and signif-
icant amounts of this capital are being directed towards the
capital-poor but labour-rich countries in the south of Asia
where returns on capital are prospectively greater and markets
are seen as having substantial potential for growth. Between
2012 and 2015, around US$120 billion a year of net FDI
flowed into Asean, of which 40% was accounted for by in-
vestment coming from countries of North Asia (Asean
Secretariat 2017). Major recipients of this FDI in 2015 were,
according to UNCTAD, Singapore (US$65bn), Indonesia
(US$16bn), Malaysia (US$11bn), Thailand (US$11bn) and
Vietnam (US$12bn) (UNCTAD 2016). Some of these invest-
ments are of a sizeable scale. Vietnam in April 2017 acquired
its second billion dollar investment, the Japanese-backed
LotB-O Mon gas pipeline project in Kien Giang province.
The first was Samsung Display’s investment in Bac Ninh
province (VietNamNet 2017).
A large boost to the cause of regional economic integration
and to regional growth is expected to be provided by China’s
‘one belt, one road’ (OBOR) initiative, launched in 2013. This
comprises a massive infrastructure programme to connect
China with Europe overland through central Asia and to con-
nect China’s maritime routes to east Africa and the Middle
East through to the Mediterranean. While the project is touted
as an opportunity to use China’s own development experience
to leverage development in adjacent economies, it is obvious-
ly also an opportunity for Chinese businesses to draw benefit
from the lower labour costs in Southeast Asia, to create new
markets for its own goods and services and for the country to
project its political and military influence in Asia.
The scale of OBOR is significant. As of mid-2017, some
US$900 billion worth of FDI infrastructure projects were in
construction or in detailed planning under the OBOR pro-
gramme according to the China Development Bank. In 2015,
a record year for China outward FDI, with a total FDI spend of
US$146 billion, investment in OBOR countries showed a 39%
increase on 2014 (Xinhua 2016). The effect of this expenditure
should be to knit large tracts of Asia together economically and
also to provide access to markets further west. The maritime
‘road’ passes through the South China Sea and up into the Bay
of Bengal, and incorporates two the OBOR’s six development
‘corridors’, the China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor and the
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor.
The countries of Southeast Asia are generally embracing
the opportunity which the OBOR programme creates. In view
of its geographic location, greater economic maturity and its
large ethnic Chinese minority, Thailand has been busy posi-
tioning itself as the hub of CLMV trade and investment and as
the gateway to China’s development ‘road’ (Theparat 2017).
On the Indian sub-continent, Pakistan’s response has also been
positive with the leadership of Pakistan’s mineral-rich
Baluchistan province welcoming OBOR as an opportunity
to have China assist with the opening up of its undeveloped
mineral resources (Yousufzai and Jorgic 2017). India, unsur-
prisingly, is much less comfortable with China’s political
growing influence throughout the region.
Raw materials for Southeast Asia
The rate of future growth in Southeast Asia will be key to
determining its mineral raw material requirements as will the
composition of that growth. Clearly, the large amount of mon-
ey being committed to investment in infrastructure will be a
driver of mineral demand, as will growth in the region’s
manufacturing industries and the development of its real estate
market.
For the present, the region is a relatively modest user of
mineral commodities, its combined consumption of steel and
aluminium, for example, being similar to that in India (at 5 and
3% of global demand respectively). However, as in India,
demand is on a rising trend (Fig. 5). Growth in the regional
use of steel has averaged 7.5% a year in the last decade while
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growth in the use of aluminium has averaged 4.5%. Copper
growth has been slower (1.5%). This may be because of dif-
ferences in end uses (steel and aluminium are more heavily
employed in construction) or because copper imports to the
region have been entering in the form of copper semi-
manufactures as opposed to unwrought refined metal. The
major consumers of these products within the region are,
roughly in order of scale, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and
Vietnam. Clearly there is some way to go before demand in
Asean will be able to exercise a major impact on global mar-
kets. But there is no doubting the economic vibrancy of the
region or its potential.
Given the number of countries involved and the differences
between them, the issue of raw materials supply to the region
is complex.
Indonesia is a major producer and exporter of mineral com-
modities. In addition to being one of the world’s largest pro-
ducers of coal, Indonesia is a significant producer of copper,
nickel, gold, tin and bauxite. The decision of the Indonesian
government to ban the export of unprocessed minerals in 2014
unsurprisingly frightened off many foreign investors, but
Chinese companies took the opportunity to increase their in-
vestment in the local production of nickel, aluminium and
electrical power. Mining elsewhere in the Asean region is
generally on a smaller scale, although there is mine production
in the Philippines (notably copper, nickel and gold), Malaysia
(tin and bauxite), Vietnam (coal, bauxite, copper and tin),
Myanmar (tin and copper), Laos (copper and nickel) and
Thailand (zinc and tin).
In the northern part of Asean, which is to say in the CLMV
countries, although there may well be scope for increased
mine production, the emerging economic model appears to
be more focused on manufacturing activity and in keying this
manufacturing into the supply chains of the more northerly
parts of Asia. For which reason, it may well follow the devel-
opment pattern of the countries of North Asia and import the
greater part of its raw material requirements.
Of some interest in this regard is what is happening with
steel. With the demand for steel in the Asean countries rising
at 7.5% a year over the past decade, it might be expected that
production of steel in the region would have grown commen-
surately. However, it has not; it has grown scarcely at all.
Asean steel production is around 20 million tonnes a year
against a consumption of 70 million tonnes a year.
In fact, the greater part of Asean’s demand for steel is
being met by imports from China (Fig. 6). Of the 50
million tonnes which the region was required to import
in 2016, 40 million tonnes was sourced from China, the
biggest importers being Vietnam (11.7 million tonnes),
Philippines (6.5 million tonnes), Thailand (6.2 million
tonnes) and Indonesia (5.8 million tonnes). Collectively,
Asean was China’s largest export market for steel.
There is some logic to this. Steel-making benefits from
economies of scale and building small high-cost steel
plants to meet the relatively limited demand arising in
local markets is not particularly attractive when China’s
low-cost, large-scale steel producers to the north have
substantial overcapacity. It may be that for some time to
come this will represent a pattern for other metals such as
aluminium too, with China using its massive might in
mineral raw material markets to furnish supplies to its
low-wage neighbours in the south, particularly since some
of these investors will be other Chinese companies.1
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1 This said, Vietnam’s steel market has now grown to a size when it can
support a large local steel producer and Formosa Plastics in 2017 started up
a large (22 million tonnes a year) steel mill in central Ha Tinh province.
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This may represent the pattern for OBOR investment
too. Given that most of the money for OBOR projects is
coming from China and that a big role will be played by
Chinese contractors in building out the infrastructure under
the programme, it may be assumed that many of the min-
eral raw materials required for these investments will be
sourced from China.
Concluding remarks
The development and economic integration of South and
Southeast Asia is arguably the most interesting growth story
in the world today. Although comprising countries highly dis-
parate in their nature, and although obviously lacking the eco-
nomic cohesion of China, collectively the region has simply
enormous untapped economic potential. It will undoubtedly
become a growing force in the global economy and take up
part of the running in driving the global economy as China’s
domestic economy matures and slows.
However, it looks improbable that the growth of South and
Southeast Asia will have the same impact on global mineral
markets as China, at least not for many years to come. This is
partly because, for the moment at least, the size of these econ-
omies is dwarfed by China and partly because of the lesser
mineral intensity of these economies. The relative scale of de-
mand for selected metals is vividly illustrated in Fig. 7. While it
certainly is the case that Asia is now the key regional market for
minerals, with two thirds of total global demand, demand in
South and Southeast Asia will have to travel a long way to
represent a major offset to market developments in China and
to achieve a number of years of the sort of double-digit demand
growth that marked China’s industrialisation.
In fact, China’s model of raw material demand growth may
not be wholly relevant to how mineral markets develop in
South and Southeast Asia. It could be that the major mineral
and metallurgical powerhouses in the region, certainly China,
but perhaps India and Indonesia also, will use their resource
endowments and scale to furnish many of the mineral raw
materials that the other countries in the region will require
for their industrialisation, removing the incentive for countries
more focused on manufacturing to establish their own metal-
lurgical and semi-fabricating industries. The competitive ad-
vantage of many of these economies, after all, lies more in
low-wage manufacturing and services than in geologically
dependent, energy-intensive, mineral production.
The switch in the focus of Chinese investment from the
domestic arena towards FDI may not much change things
either. This is partly because the scale of the outward
investment, although unquestionably large, is nonetheless
modest by comparison with the massive growth of
China’s domestic investment which drove the commodity
boom in the 2000s (Robertson 2017). Moreover, much of
the mineral consumption stimulated by the OBOR
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programme may report as increased consumption in China
rather than in the countries where the investment is actu-
ally taking place, since it is likely that China will supply a
lot of the raw materials for the investment.
In short, although the South and Southeast Asian re-
gion holds really positive implications for future mineral
raw material markets, it may not be quite the next ‘big
thing’ that many in the mining industry might be hoping
for. More than ever, it seems that China’s extraordinary
impact on mineral markets in the 2000s was a one-off
event. There is no new China.
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